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BLUNDERBUSS SCHOLARSHIP: PERVERTING THE 
ORIGINAL INTENT AND PLAIN MEANING OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT 
Kenneth Lassont 
[E}fforts to undermine the Second Amendment, to deride it and degrade it 
... threaten not only the physical well-being of millions of Americans but also 
the core concept of individual liberty our founding fathers struggled to peifect 
and protect. 
- Charleton Heston 1 
[The Second Amendment} has been the subject of one of the greatest pieces of 
frauds, and I repeat the word ''.fraud, " on the American public by special inter-
est groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime. 
- Warren Burger2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In America, guns have long evoked passions on all sides - from the 
revolutionary ardor of the Founding Fathers to the libertarian im-
pulses of modern-day citizens, from gun-control advocates pursuing 
the limitation of violence both criminal and unintended, to the indig-
nant fervor motivating the primary proponent of an individual's right 
to bear arms, the National Rifle Association. Regardless of one's per-
spective, however, there is no escaping the serious controversy and 
consequences of gun ownership. 
The statistical ledger is staggering. A handgun is manufactured 
every twenty seconds in the United States.3 In a population of some 
260 million, there are about 222 million firearms in circulation. Some-
one is injured or killed by a handgun every twenty seconds. Thirteen 
children are struck by bullets every day. 4 Between the gun massacre at 
Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999 and March 2001, there 
were some twenty school shootings or attempted shootings around 
t Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. Many thanks to my research 
assistant, Carl Zacarias (a graduate of the University of Baltimore School of 
Law), for his hard work and diligent contributions to this article. 
1. President of the National Rifle Association. See SAN FRANCISCO EXAM'R, 
Sept.12, 1997, at A-II. 
2. Former Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court. The MacNeil/Lehrer 
News Hour: First Freedoms (Television Broadcast, Dec. 16, 1991). 
3. Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction 
of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REv. 57, 59 (1995). 
4. [d. at 59-60. 
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the country.5 According to the Youth Risk Behavior Survey conducted 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, nearly six percent 
of the nation's high school students reported carrying a gun to school 
in the thirty days preceding the survey.6 The Journal of the American 
Medical Association reports that 1.2 million children have access to 
guns at home.7 
Nevertheless, in the face of all these figures, the gun lobby's advo-
cacy of a Constitutional right to bear arms becomes even more shrill. 
The NRA emphasizes the importance of self-protection and individual 
liberty as historic cornerstones of our democratic values. The Bush 
Administration has gone on record as opposing a United Nations res-
olution to reduce international trafficking in small arms.8 Attorney 
GeneralJohn Ashcroft is a vocal member of the National Rifle Associa-
tion and opposes gun-control legislation.9 
Although critics of the gun culture are similarly vociferous, and rea-
sonable people can differ on the historical interpretation of the Sec-
ond Amendment and the legal issues raised by its jurisprudence, both 
pundits and scholars have often generated more heat than light on 
the subject. Of the ample literature both for and against gun control, 
many of the more recent articles have supported an individualist point 
of view - that is, that the Constitution confers on private citizens the 
5. Amanda Bower, Scorecard of Hatred, TIME, Mar. 19, 2001, at 31. There are 
many other statistics as well. For example, the leading cause of death 
among African-American males aged 15-19 is by gunshot wounds; see Herz, 
supra note 3, at 60. Statistical data is collected and maintained by both the 
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence and the Violence Policy Center. 
Competing statistics are kept by the National Rifle Association. But see 
David Limbaugh, Gunning for Ashcroft, WASH. TIMES, July 17, 2001, at AlB 
("[S]ome 2.5 million times each year, law-abiding individuals use guns de-
fensively to protect themselves and their property from assault. Individual 
gun ownership does make our streets (and homes) safer."). 
6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Facts About Violence Among 
Youth and Violence in Schools available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/ 
pressrel/r99 0421.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2003). 
7. Do Guns Make Us Safe?, at http://www.stopgunviolence.org/info/gun-
safe.htm (last visited Mar. IB, 2003). 
B. See John R. Bolton, U.S. Statement at Plenary Session UN Conference on 
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (July 9, 
2001), available at http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/statement/ 
usE.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2003); see also Brian Whitaker, Plans to Cut 
Sales Resisted fry U.S., THE GUARDIAN, July 10, 2001, at Guardian Foreign 
Pages 13. 
9. Aside from voting against no fewer than thirteen gun-controllaws as a Sena-
tor, in 2001 Ashcroft made a pledge to the National Rifle Association in a 
letter read aloud at the NRA convention in Kansas City: "Let me state un-
equivocally my view that the text and the original intent of the Second 
Amendment clearly protect the right of individuals to keep and bear fire-
arms." Letter to NRA executive director James Jay Baker (May 17, 2001), 
quoted in Bob Herbert, More Guns for Everyone!, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,2002, 
at A 39. 
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right to bear arms. IO A number of these articles are unabashedly 
funded by the National Rifle Association itself. II Some of them, how-
ever, are written by a new wave of formerly "liberal" scholars who have 
jumped on the current anti-gun-control bandwagon. 
Those who argue that the Constitution confers upon every individ-
ual citizen a clear and inalienable right to own guns must inevitably 
struggle to reconcile their views with historical evidence, the plain lan-
guage of the Second Amendment - and, most relevant, the almost 
uniformly narrow interpretation by courts, low and high, which refuse 
to recognize an individual right. 
But much of the new scholarship flies in the face of a history of 
unequivocal holdings by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
supporting a collectivist point of view - that is, that the right to bear 
arms is conditioned upon the need for security of the (collective) 
group - as well as the courts' clear understanding that the Constitu-
tion in no way limits states from enacting and imposing their own re-
strictive gun legislation. 
There are other reasons for supporting the collective view, includ-
ing the plain meaning of the words in the Second Amendment;12 the 
original intent of the Framers (based on historical evidence indicating 
an emphasis on the need for a militia); and the fact that the Constitu-
tion is designed to be an evolving document (which can and should 
address the needs and capabilities of a dynamically changing society). 
This is especially true in the wake and midst of terrorism on American 
soil, a phenomenon that may have a profound effect on the way we 
choose to protect ourselves. 
Though issues of national security remain justifiably paramount, 
the Constitution is supposed to change with the times. This long-ac-
cepted principle appears to be ignored in the spate of revisionist 
10. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to 
Arms, 43 DUKE LJ. 1236, 1242 (1994); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, 
Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ. 1141 
(1996); Don B. Kates,Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the 
Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 267-68 (1983); Nelson Lund, The 
Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to SelfPreseroation, 39 ALA. L. 
REv. 103, 108 (1987). 
11. See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A 
Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 2, 8-9 n.28 (2000) (cataloging the affiliations of 
individual rights proponents with the NRA and other gun rights organiza-
tions); see also NRA Civil Rights Defense Funds Research and Grants web 
page, available at http://www.nradefensefund.org/ docs/research.html (last 
visited Mar. 12,2003). 
12. According to former Chief Justice Burger, the first clause must be read, 
"because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State," 
which thereby renders the second clause clearly subordinate, as it was in-
tended to be. Speech at news conference announcing introduction of the 
Public Health and Safety Act of 1992 (June 26, 1992); see also Burger, The 
Right to Bear Arms, PARADE MAGAZINE, Jan. 14, 1990; Interview with Chief 
Justice Burger, on McNeil/Lehrer News Hour (Dec. 16, 1991). 
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scholarship promulgated by proponents of an individualist point of 
view. The recent literature demonstrates anew that the academic 
voice can be manipulated to prove virtually any proposition, no matter 
how absurd. In our increasingly violent world, it becomes especially 
important to analyze the blunderbuss of newly minted Second 
Amendment scholarship, and to challenge it. 
The blunderbuss proliferation of gun-rights scholarship in recent 
years has perverted both the historical context and plain meaning of 
the Second Amendment. This Article seeks to address the current 
spate of such revisionist history; to respond to the lone court decision 
supporting the individualist point of view; 13 and to expose the perva-
sive extent and nefarious effects of NRA lobbying efforts - what Chief 
Justice Burger described as a fraud and others see as a calamitous per-
petuation of preventable violence. 
II. HISTORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us! But passion 
and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives us is a lantern to 
the stern which shines only on the waves behind us. 
- Samuel Taylor Coleridge14 
Arty examination of the history and development of the Second 
Amendment should rest on one clear presumption: even without in-
terpreting the Framers' "original intent" or parsing the "plain mean-
ing" of the Second Amendment, gun regulation would still be justified 
because nowhere in the Constitution are states limited from so doing. 
At bottom, state action to control the sale, possession, or use of fire-
arms can be justified simply from the high number of casualties in-
curred annually by deliberate and accidental use of firearms. It is a 
fundamental precept in Constitutional interpretation that present-day 
issues take precedence over "the obsolescent understandings of gener-
ations long past." 15 
From a strictly historical perspective, however, the overwhelming 
weight of available evidence demonstrates that the primary concern of 
the Founding Fathers was the concept of a militia - as distinguished 
from a standing federal army-not the right of each individual citizen 
to own firearms.16 
13. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (1999). 
14. English poet and critic, 1772-1834. THE NEW DIGrIONARY OF THOUGHTS 271 
(Tryon Edwards ed., 1961). 
15. Letter from a Federal Framer (Jan. 25, 1788), in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 362-63 (John P. Kaminski 
& Gasparej. Saladin a eds., 1995); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION 1787, at 182, 330-31 (Max Farrand ed., 1966); see also Jack N. Rakove, 
The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
103, 107 (2000). 
16. See, e.g., Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America: The Regulation of 
Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAw & HIST. REv. 567, 588 (1998); Paul 
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At issue was where the boundary between national and state respon-
sibilities would lie. As the records from the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the ensuing ratification campaign, and the debates in the First 
Congress of 1789 all demonstrate, the issue under debate was always 
the militia and who would control it.I7 
The primary discussions about the Second Amendment took place 
on the eighteenth and twenty-third of August, 1787. Nothing was said 
then to suggest that a militia would be composed of individuals spon-
taneously gathering together to defend against tyranny by the govern-
ment. Any fair reading of these texts yields the conclusion that the 
debates of 1787-88 were primarily concerned with the question of a 
militia, and not whether there was or should be a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to own and carry firearms. The Second Amendment 
can thus be read as a distilled version of the comparable statements 
found in the state declarations of rights and the amendments recom-
mended by several ratification conventions. The Amendment af-
firmed the fundamental proposition that liberty would be better 
served if the nation were to defend itself by using a militia composed 
of citizen-soldiers rather than by maintaining a permanent military 
establishment. IS 
Similarly, because personal firearms had little practical use at the 
time in the citizenry's private lives, it is anachronistic to argue that the 
Founding Fathers comprehended, much less addressed, the problem 
of firearms regulation in its modern form. In fact, whether or not 
individuals had a right to own firearms free of regulation by the states 
was a matter of complete indifference at the time the Second Amend-
ment was being discussed. In those years the majority of American 
households probably did not possess firearms. There were few skilled 
gunsmiths in the colonies, so almost all weapons were imported. Nev-
ertheless they were prone to rust and disrepair and likely to deterio-
rate rapidly. The militias of the time were poorly armed and trained. 
Americans had little use for hunting, which was considered a leisure 
activity for the elite; trapping was much more efficient. I9 
Records of gun regulation in the states, both before and after ratifi-
cation of the Second Amendment, strongly suggest that it did not con-
template the ownership and use of firearms by private citizens. 
Following in the tradition of Great Britain, the several colonies had 
passed measures requiring citizens to carry and maintain arms in cer-
tain circumstances - and prohibiting ownership in others. Many of 
Finkelman, "A Well Regulated Militia": The Second Amendment in Historical Per-
spective, 76 CHl.-KENT L. REv. 195,236 (2000); Rakove, supra note 15, at 111-
12; David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional 
Change, 99 MICH. L. REv. 588, 597 (2000). 
17. See Rakove, supra note 15, at 145. 
18. Id. at 128-158. 
19. See Bellesiles, supra note 16, at 582-83 passim. 
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the former laws grew out of the states' inability to sufficiently supply its 
militia; many of the latter were based on an underlying distrust of 
certain groups of people. These restrictive regulations were in force 
before the Constitutional Conventions took place, and were left un-
scathed after the ratification of the Second Amendment. Indeed, fol-
lowing ratification, the states continued to pass new laws that closely 
monitored gun ownership.20 
With but one exception, all courts in the early nineteenth century 
upheld gun regulations when they were challenged as a violation of 
individual rights. 21 The lone exception occurred in Kentucky, where a 
restrictive law was struck down.22 However, the Kentucky legislature 
promptly amended the militia provision in its constitution, upon 
which the court's decision was based, so that it more closely resembled 
the language in the Second Amendment. 
Proponents of an individual-rights reading of the Second Amend-
ment often engage in highly selective use of historical facts to support 
their position. Perhaps most egregious is a remark by George Mason 
during the Virginia Ratification Convention, which advocates of the 
individual-right interpretation frequently cite as a clear statement that 
the Framers meant the militia to be a group of individual citizens: 
"Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a 
few public officers."23 But that statement is lifted totally out of context 
by many individualist writers, who delete reference to Mason's very 
next sentence: 
But I cannot say who will be the militia of the future day. If 
that paper on the table [the Constitution] gets no alteration, 
the militia of the future day may not consist of all classes, 
high and low, and rich and poor; but may be confined to the 
lower and middle classes of the people, granting exclusion to 
the higher classes of the people.24 . 
20. Id. at 587. 
21. See, e.g., Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840); State v. Reid, 
1 Ala. 612 (1840). 
22. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822). 
23. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, "THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED" THE EVOLUTION OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 74 (Univ. of New Mexico Press 1984). 
24. Rakove, supra note 15, at 136-37. Three notable examples of selective his-
torians: HALBROOK, supra note 23, at 74; Kates, Jr., supra note 10, at 216 
n.51; and Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE 
LJ. 637, 647 (1989). Mason's argument echoes one made by Luther Mar-
tin, a Maryland delegate to the Constitutional Convention who subse-
quently opposed ratification. Martin complained that the Constitution 
would "enable the government totally to discard, render useless, and even 
disarm the militia, when it would remove them out of the way of opposing 
its ambitious views .... The general government has a power ... of which 
they may be rendered utterly useless and insignificant, when it suits the 
ambitious purposes of government." Luther Martin, To the Citizens of Mary-
land, Md.]., Mar. 18,1788, in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
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Similar misrepresentations of context appear elsewhere. Among 
them is the use made of James Madison's tribute to the militia in The 
Federalist No. 46.25 Any attempt by a standing army to impose tyranny, 
quote the individual-right advocates: "[W]ould be opposed [by] a mi-
litia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their 
hands .... It was to ... 'be doubted whether a militia thus circum-
stanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular 
troops' as the national government could plausibly acquire."26 
Madison went on to remind his readers of "the advantage of being 
armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every 
other nation," - especially those living in European monarchies, 
which "are afraid to trust the people with arms."27 
But Madison's purpose, in both his Federalist No. 45 and No. 46, was 
to compare the relative advantages that the national and state govern-
ments would enjoy in not competing for power. Nowhere did he ad-
dress (or defend) the notion that an armed citizenry would be called 
upon to resist the oppression of a combined state and federal govern-
ment. His argument throughout rests on the proposition that the mi-
litia is a part of the government, not a group of individual citizens.28 
So much for the original intent of the Framers. 
Individualist theorists also have difficulties with the plain meaning 
of the Second Amendment. In fact only a handful of sources from the 
period bear directly on the currently controversial questions concern-
ing the regulation of privately owned firearms. 29 The issues back then 
concerned the militia and its public functions - partly because eight-
eenth-century firearms were not nearly as threatening or lethal as 







CATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 419 (John P. Kaminski & GaspareJ. Saladin a 
eds., 1986); see also Rakove, supra note 15, at 138 n.88. 
Rakove, supra note 15, at 142. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (JAMES MADISON), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 492 n.l07 (John P. Kaminski 
& GaspareJ. Saladina eds. 1984); see also Rakove, supra note 15, at 142. 
Rakove, supra note 15, at 142. 
[d. at 142-143. 
Rakove, supra note 15, at 109. 
[d. at 109-10. As Professor Rakove points out: 
Theirs was a rhetoric of public liberty, not public health; of the 
danger from standing armies, not that of casual strangers, embit-
tered family members, violent youth gangs, freeway snipers, and 
careless weapons keepers. Guns were so difficult to fire in the eight-
eenth century that the very idea of being accidentally killed by one 
was itself hard to conceive. Indeed, anyone wanting either to mur-
der his family or protect his home in the eighteenth century would 
have been better advised (and much more likely) to grab an axe or 
knife than to load, prime, and discharge a firearm. And even had 
guns been more effective as personal weapons, it is nearly incon-
ceivable that eighteenth-century notions of the police power of 
state and local governments would have precluded their regulation 
in the name of some vague threat of tyranny. The American colo-
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Likewise, individualists have difficulty with "textualist" readings of 
the Second Amendment, which presume that every word serves a spe-
cific purpose."31 Under this approach, the Second Amendment must 
yield the conclusion that "militia" meant "collective body of the peo-
ple" and not individuals-indeed, those very words ("collective body 
of people") appear in earlier drafts of the Amendment, and were os-
tensibly deleted for reasons of editorial concision.32 
In denying both the facts of contextual history and the virtually 
unanimous court jurisprudence that the Second Amendment guaran-
tees militias and not private ownership rights, individualists betray the 
fundamental weaknesses of their position. Their approach ignores 
both history and judicial precedent. 
Thoughtful historians face a daunting task in trying to determine 
objectively the intentions of the Founding Fathers as they drafted the 
Second Amendment. They must divest themselves of both their own 
prejudicial passions and a multitude of selective chronicles and com-
mentaries about guns in early America. Who owned what? If one ad-
heres strictly to an examination of the issue from a colonial 
perspective, the notion that there was an abundance of arms leisurely 
possessed by most colonial households becomes a myth - which 
when laid aside reveals the true nature of the debate waged by the 
Founding Fathers: whether an individual citizen had a right to bear 
arms beyond the context of a state militia. The evidence suggests that 
the answer to that question is resoundingly "no." 
The idea of extending the Second Amendment outside the frame-
work of a state militia did not come about until after the Civil War -
well after such forces as the primary defender of the state became 
obsolete.33 Such an idea would have been news to the Founding Fa-
thers; there is simply no evidence that it was the original intent of 
those who crafted the Second Amendment. 
Id. 
nies and states were not a libertarian utopia; their traditions of gov-
ernance permitted legislatures and institutions of local government 
to act vigorously in the pursuit of public health and safety. 
31. See id. at 126. 
32. Id. at 124-26. 
33. MICHAEL BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN 
CULTURE (1996), Chapters 9-lO. Although Bellesiles' table indicating that 
guns were not prevalent in estates prior to 1800 has been successfully chal-
lenged by scholars, his analysis of the rise of the gun culture in America 
subsequent to the Mexican War, and particularly after the Civil War, has 
not. Interview with Dr. Edward Papenfuse, State Archivist of Maryland, in 
Annapolis, MD, (March 4, 2003); see also James Lindgren, Fall From Grace: 
Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, III YALE LJ. 2195, 2202 (2002) 
(spearheading the attack on Bellesiles' work). But see Jon Wiener, Emory's 
Bellesiles Repvrt: A Case of Tunnel Vision, and Lee W. Formwalt, Bellesiles, OAH, 
and the Profession, 31 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS NEWSLETTER 1 
(Feb. 2003). 
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However, the idea, once prevalent only in Pennsylvania and Ken-
tucky, began to take hold after the Civil War.34 But even then it was 
less grounded in a constitutional privilege than in a broad-scale adver-
tising campaign launched in the second half of the 19th century.35 
The scholarship of gun-rights advocates, who doggedly assert that 
America has had a life-long history of firearm ownership, is a percep-
tion clouded by a dramatic post-Civil War increase in the private pos-
session of pistols. 
Possession of small arms became the way of the frontier thanks 
largely to Samuel Colt, who received a patent for his six-shot pistol in 
1836. His efficient use of interchangeable parts and methodology of 
mass production not only made guns easily accessible for the average 
citizen, but also served to nurture the belief in a Constitutional right 
to bear them. 
It is beyond controversy that the period's unprecedented demand 
for small firearms resulted from new gun regulation in the states -
both before and after ratification of gun regulation in the states and 
before and after ratification technology pioneered by Colt.36 
At the time of debate over the Second Amendment, the drafters' 
conception of a military power did not contemplate an unqualified 
individual right to bear arms. The documentary evidence from the 
Constitutional Conventions supports the proposition that the issue of 
prime concern regarding the right to bear arms was preservation of 
the state militia. No fewer than eight Federalist Papers were devoted at 
least in part to defending the Constitutional Convention's decision 
that Congress provided for a standing army.37 During the debate over 
ratification of the Constitution, several states expressed fear that pro-
viding for a federal army without an explicit and concurrent right of 
the sovereign states to maintain their own militias might render the 
southern states defenseless against slave insurrection, and might sub-
ject the states' militiamen to unjust deployment at the political pre-
rogative of the federal government.38 
Prior to the debates over ratification of the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights, several states already had in their constitutions a provi-
sion concerning a right to bear arms. Among them were Delaware, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
34. PA CaNST. art. I, § 13; KY CaNST. § 1. 
35. InteIView with Edward Papenfuse, supra note 33. 
36. For a brief description and diagram of Colt's six-shooter, see KENNETH LAs. 
SON, MOUSETRAPS AND MUFFLING CUPs: ONE HUNDRED BRILLIANT AND BI-
ZARRE UNITED STATES PATENTS 18-19 (Arbor House 1986). 
37. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 8, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 (Alexander Hamilton); Nos. 
41, 46 Games Madison). 
38. Carl Bogus, Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 D.C. DAVIS L. REv. 
309, 348-50 (1998). 
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Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia.39 In fact, the entire Bill of 
Rights can arguably be derived from these state constitutions.40 
The various provisions regarding the right to bear arms reveal the 
precise lines of political factions on the debate surrounding arms: one 
side of the debate not recognizing a right to bear arms as necessary 
for the preservation of a state militia, the other seeing to the contrary 
and in addition other purposes served by such a right. Meanwhile, in 
the middle was a moderate faction recognizing the right - but only 
in the interests of state security. Maryland, founded originally as a 
haven from religious persecution, but has since developed into a stal-
wart of other constitutional civilliberties,41 provided in its constitution 
for a militia, but not for an explicit right to bear arms.42 Maryland 
took the position that some state control of military forces was prefera-
ble, but stood only for the proposition that "substituting a militia in 
place of a standing army is an essential right in maintaining govern-






Delaware's Declaration of Rights stated that "a well regulated militia is the 
proper, natural and safe defence of a free government." DEL. CONST. art. I, 
§ 18, (1776). Maryland declared in its Declaration of Rights that "a well 
regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of a free government." 
MD. CONST. art. 25 (1776). The Declaration of Rights of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts declared that "the people have a right to keep and 
bear arms for the common defence." MASs. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII (1780). 
New Hampshire's Bill of Rights stated that a "well regulated militia is the 
proper, natural, and sure defence of a state" and that "[n]o person who is 
conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms, shall be 
compelled thereto." N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIII (1784). New York, in its 
Constitution, provided that "the militia of this State, at all times hereafter, 
as well in peace as in war, shall be armed and disciplined, and in readiness 
for service." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 50 (1777). North Carolina's Declaration of 
Rights stated that "the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of 
the State." N.C. CONST. art. XVII (1776). Pennsylvania, in its Declaration of 
Rights, stated that "the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves and the state." PA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1776). Vermont's Decla-
ration of Rights declared that "the people have a right to bear arms for the 
defence of themselves and the State .... " VT. CONST. CH. 1, art. XV (1777). 
Virginia's Bill of Rights stated that "a well-regulated militia, composed of 
the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe 
defence of a free state .... " VA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1776). 
Edward Dumbauld, State Precedents for the Bill of Rights, 7 ]. PUB. L. 323, 343-
44 app. A (1958). 
See generally Daniel Friedman, The History, Development, and Interpretation of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 71 TEMPLE L. REv. 637 (1998). 
MD. CONST. art. 29. 
Eight of the thirteen states - Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, and Virginia - represented 
one side of the debate: that a well-regulated militia is an important function 
of state security. For those states, the idea of an individual right to bear 
arms was necessary - for the security of the individual was never contem-
plated. Bogus, supra note 38, at 365; Dumbauld, supra note 40, at 343-44; 
see also Robert Hardaway, Elizabeth Gormley, & Bryan Taylor, The Inconve-
nient Militia Clause: Why the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate Over the 
Right to Bear Arms, 16 ST. JOHNS]' LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 79-80 (2002). 
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Prior to the recognition of this interest within some of the states, 
Madison arguably had no intention of including an arms provision in 
his proposed Bill of Rights.44 Only those states whose constitutions 
provided explicitly for a right of the people to bear arms pursued its 
inclusion in the Bill of Rights. Of those, all but New Hampshire ex-
plicitly stated the purpose behind the right.45 North Carolina, Massa-
chusetts, and Virginia looked upon the right as no more than one 
necessary for the defense of the state.46 
Only two states - Pennsylvania and Vermont - went beyond the 
state-defense rationale for a right to bear arms.47 Their constitutions 
explicitly granted a right to bear arms for the purpose of defending 
oneself in addition to the state. Even in Pennsylvania, which naturally 
pressed for a constitutional amendment granting a right to bear arms, 
that right was never referred to outside the context of the federal mili-
tary.48 Vermont was not yet a state, and the documentary history is 
scarce. 
Historical documents provide no direct evidence of the colonial pe-
riod of these states, or reasonable inferences derived therefrom, as to 
why they felt the need for an individual right. 
Concerning the balance between federal and state military powers, 
there is a great distance in philosophy between the states whose con-
stitutions granted a right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense 
and those which did not. Pennsylvania and Vermont both took a de-
cidedly extreme position in respect to constitution-making, for these 
documents were political, and not regulatory. In the context of the 
debate over original intent, there is an important distinction to be 
drawn between the right to "bear" arms and the right to "use" them. 
The right to "bear arms" is aimed at a political end. It is a distinct 
military phrase having political implications. A person in the pursuit 
of game or target shooting might carry his rifle, yet it would never be 
said that he had borne arms.49 These military connotations were even 
more strewn about in the earlier drafts of the Amendment, from 
Madison's original text to other contemporary uses of the phrase 
"bear arms."50 More important, splitting the Amendment in two -








Bogus, supra note 38, at 364. 
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIII (1784). 
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1776); MAss. CONST. pt.l, art. XVII (1780); VA. 
CONST. art. I, § 13 (1776). 
SeePA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1776); VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XV (1777). 
See generally The Address and Reasons for Dissent of the Minority of the Convention 
of Pennsylvania Speaking to their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), in 2 THE BILL OF 
RiGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 662 (Bernard Schwartz ed., McGraw-Hill 
1971). 
Akhil Reed Amar, Enduring and Empowering: The Bill of Rights In the Third 
Millennium: Second Thoughts, 65 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 104 (2002). 
David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitu-
tional Change, 99 MICH. L. REv. 588, 618 (2000). 
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arms" language, having a military connotation, reflects the Amend-
ment's purpose of protecting the militia articulated in the first 
clause.51 
On the other hand, the right to "use" is by its nature a right impli-
cating regulation. Such a right is subject to the changing times and 
developments in technology. The overwhelming amount of evidence 
indicates that the Second Amendment sought to address the political 
right. At the time the Amendment was adopted, the dominant mean-
ing of the phrase "bear arms," particularly in a political context, was in 
reference to the use of weapons by soldiers or militiamen. 52 
Even if Pennsylvania and Vermont sought to have the Second 
Amendment grant a right for individuals to freely own and use arms 
in addition to militia rights, this argument was rejected by virtue of 
the constitutional process of compromise. Resources exist indicating 
what Madison considered when drafting and deciding what to include 
in the Bill of Rights. In drafting the Bill of Rights as a whole, he took 
into account the more than four hundred separate clauses of the state 
constitutions. For the Second Amendment, he specifically drew from 
the concerns expressed at the Virginia ratifYing convention of 1788.53 
Those concerns consisted entirely of slave control and the power of 
the federal army.54 Thus, the debate over the Second Amendment 
was narrowed to the issue of how to divide military power between the 
states and the federal government for the purpose of state security -
that is, steering clear of an oppressive federal army. 
It is important to keep in mind the essence of the constitutional 
process and debate which took place in Philadelphia: compromise. 
The compromise was not one that everyone agreed upon; it was one 
of the majority. The extreme viewpoints in dissent on all issues were 
excluded by way of the compromise process. In its opposition to ratifi-
cation, the dissenting minority of the Pennsylvania convention stated 
its concern over the absence of a right to bear arms.55 
Benjamin Franklin aptly characterized the final product of the Con-
stitutional Conventions: "I confess that there are several parts of this 
Constitution which I db not at present approve, but I am not sure I 
shall never approve them; for the older I grow, the more apt I am to 
doubt my own judgment and to pay more respect to the judgment of 
others."56 
51. Id. at 617. 
52. See id. at 619-21. 
53. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 705. 
54. Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 27, 1788), in Schwartz, supra note 48, 
at 765. 
55. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 628, 665. 
56. Benjamin Franklin, Speech to the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 17, 1787), in 
13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
213 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladina eds., 1981). 
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III. INTERPRETATIONS BY THE COURTS 
"[Tlhat the Second Amendment poses no barrier to strong gun laws is per-
haps the most well-settled proposition in American constitutional law. '67 
Indeed, virtually all of the case law construing the Second Amend-
ment limits the right of individuals to bear arms.58 Lower federal 
courts have consistently held that only those using firearms in connec-
tion with their service in an organized state militia are so entitled.59 
Moreover, the courts have invariably ruled that various laws limiting 
the private sale, ownership, and use of firearms do not violate the Sec-
ond Amendment because such restrictions have no effect on the 
maintenance of a well-regulated militia - that is, the National 
Guard.60 
The ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, 
has likewise affirmed the rights of American citizens to protect them-
selves - but only in the context of the maintenance of a militia or 
other such public-security force. 61 
A. Supreme Court Case Law 
In fact, there have been only three Supreme Court decisions that 
have dealt directly with the Second Amendment, the latest and most 
substantive of which was well over a half-century ago.62 In that case, 
United States v. Miller,63 the defendants were charged with unlawfully 
transporting an unregistered firearm in interstate commerce.64 The 
Court sustained a statute requiring registration of sawed-off shotguns 
under the National Firearms Act.65 In construing the Second Amend-










In the absence of any evidence tending to show that posses-
sion or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eigh-
teen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regu-
lated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment 
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. 
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is 
Erwin N. Griswold (former Solicitor General of United States), Phantom Sec-
ond Amendment 'Rights', WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1990, at C7 (emphasis added). 
See Herz, supra note 3, at 75-76. 
Id. at 68; see also infra Part III.B-C. 
Herz, supra note 3, at 68, 75-76; see also infra Part III.B & C. 
See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,178 (1939). 
See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
the Supreme Court has not addressed a Second Amendment issue since the 
Miller decision) (citing Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (lst Cir. 
1942». 
307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
Miller, 307 U.S. at 175. 
Id. at 178. 
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any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use 
could contribute to the common defense.66 
Although Miller also contained some historical information about 
the colonists and the restrictions on and reasons for bearing arms, its 
narrow holding is often used by opponents of gun control legislation 
to suggest that the collective-right view implied by the Court was some-
what less than unambiguous. But that interpretation ignores the clear 
context of the decision, as well as some other pertinent language in 
the opinion. Mter noting that the Constitution, as originally adopted, 
granted Congress the power to: 
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of 
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To 
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, 
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in 
the Service of the United States, reserving to the States re-
spectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Author-
ity of training the Militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress.67 
The Court went on to conclude that: 
[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the continuation and 
render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declara-
tion and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. 
It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view. 
The Militia which the states were expected to maintain and 
train is set in contrast with Troops which they were forbid-
den to keep without the consent of Congress.68 
Thus the most plausible interpretation of Miller is that an individual 
using a firearm must be doing so in the context of service in a govern-
ment-organized (not independent) militia. 
In the two earlier cases, the Supreme Court offered passing instruc-
tion about even narrower Second Amendment issues. United States v. 
Cruikshank69 held that the Second Amendment leaves the people to 
look to the "internal police" for their protection. 70 And Presser v. Illi-
nois71 flatly rejected the idea of a right to bear arms in order to organ-
ize independent armies or to prepare for insurrection against a 
potentially despotic government. In Presser, the defendant had led a 
parade of rifle-bearing members of a German nationalist organization 
without obtaining the permit required under the challenged Illinois 
statute, which prohibited any group of men other than the officially 
66. [d. (citation omitted). 
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
68. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79. 
69. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
70. See id. at 553. 
71. 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
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organized Illinois voluntary militia from associating as a military or-
ganization. The Court expressly rejected the insurrectionist view of 
the Second Amendment, and said it made little sense in light of the 
militia's constitutionally commanded role of suppressing insurrec-
tions.72 As one commentator succinctly contended: 
[h] ow can the militia be a collection of citizens with the con-
stitutionally guaranteed right to engage in armed resistance 
against their government if the Constitution itself grants 
Congress the power to call out the militia . . . [to suppress 
Insurrections]. The Constitution cannot view the militia both 
as a means by which government can suppress insurrection 
and as an instrument for insurrection against the 
government. 73 
Although there is much discussion today about what "militia" 
means, the Supreme Court had no trouble with the term. The Court 
found the word defined in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution -
"the militia organized by Congress and subject to joint federal and 
state control.,,74 This is generally referred to as the "collective right" 
model because it contents that the Second Amendment grants the 
people a collective right to an armed militia, rather than an individual 
right to keep and bear arms for one's own purposes, notwithstanding 
governmental regulation.75 
The collective-right model remained widely accepted for nearly a 
century - steadfastly adhered to by the lower courts, relying on the 
Supreme Court's three opinions.76 
The Supreme Court has rejected both the broad individual-right 
view and any private right to bear arms for collective insurrectionist 
purposes - as well as repeated attempts to incorporate the Second 
Amendment into the Fourteenth. Thus, the right to bear arms poses 
no restrictions on the states.77 
B. The Lower Federal Courts 
Taking their cue from the Supreme Court every federal appellate 
decision since Miller has rejected the broad-individual-rights position, 
instead focusing the analysis on whether the use of a weapon was re-
lated to maintaining a well-regulated militia. Similarly, the lower ap-
72. See id. at 254, 262-66. 
73. Herz, supra note 3, at 70-71 (citation omitted). 
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 16. 
75. Bogus, supra note 11, at 3-4. 
76. Id. 
77. Herz, supra note 3, at 71-74. Gun-rights activists have argued that these deci-
sions are invalid because they came prior to the onset of the modern incor-
poration doctrine. But the Court has refused to grant certiorari in any of 
the cases dismissing Second Amendment challenges to state regulations on 
non-incorporation grounds. Id. 
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pellate courts have uniformly rejected the contention that Miller 
extends constitutional protection to all weapons with military utility.78 
The Tenth Circuit, for example, has noted that "[t]he purpose of 
the [S]econd [A]mendment as stated by the Supreme Court [in 
Miller] was to preserve the effectiveness and assure the continuation of 
the state militia."79 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit reviewed Miller in 
the process of upholding the ban of the Village of Morton Grove, Illi-
nois, on handgun possession: "Construing this language [of the Sec-
ond Amendment] according to its plain meaning, it seems clear that 
the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the preservation of 
a militia."so The Eleventh Circuit dismissed as "without merit" the as-
sertion that a federal ban on private ownership of automatic machine 
guns obtained after 1986 was unconstitutional - a decision that the 
NRA called "the first ban on firearms possession by law-abiding citi-
zens in American history."sl 
In a later case, gun-rights activists had claimed that the Second 
Amendment offered a judicially enforceable collective right, or that it 
presented a fundamental individual right.s2 The Eighth Circuit did 
not feel the need even to discuss the "collective" versus the "individ-
ual" right distinction, stating: "Whether the 'right to bear arms' for 
militia purposes is 'individual' or 'collective' in nature is irrelevant 
where, as here, the individual's possession of arms is not related to the 
preservation or efficiency of a militia."s3 
The lower federal courts have almost uniformly ruled that the Sec-
ond Amendment right to bear arms applies only to those individuals 
using firearms in connection with their service in an organized state 
militia.84 An extraordinarily consistent body of case law has held that 
a variety of restrictions on private firearms ownership, use, and sales 
do not violate the Second Amendment, because such restrictions have 
no effect on the maintenance of a well-regulated militia, such as the 
National Guard.s5 Until very recently, the lower federal courts have 
consistently found an inviolable nexus between the right to bear arms 
and the establishment of a militia.86 
As far back as 1943, federal courts have held that "the federal gov-
ernment can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individ-
ual as well as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the 
78. Id. at 74. 
79. United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (1977). 
80. Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261,270 (1982). 
81. Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041, 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 1990). 
82. United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992). 
83. Id. 
84. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942); see, e.g., supra note 
61. 
85. Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally, infra notes 
92-94. 
86. See infra Part III.C.1 and accompanying text. 
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possession or use of any weapon which has any reasonable relation-
ship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia."87 
In 1976, a federal appellate court in Ohio upheld the conviction of 
a defendant who had been charged with possessing an unregistered 
submachine gun.88 The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, 
holding that: 
the Second Amendment guaranteed a collective rather than 
an individual right; that the fact that defendant, in common 
with all adult residents and citizens of Ohio, was subject to 
enrollment in the state militia did not confer any Second 
Amendment right upon him to possess the submachine gun; 
that the National Firearms Act did not attempt to taX the 
right to keep and bear arms and thus did not apply to any 
right protected by the Second Amendment; and that the pos-
session of an unregistered submachine gun was not an addi-
tional fundamental right protected by the Ninth 
Amendment.89 
The court further noted, in 1971, it had held that, "[s]ince the Sec-
ond Amendment right 'to keep and bear Arms' applies only to the 
right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individual's right 
to bear arms, there can be no serious claim to any express constitu-
tional right of an individual to possess a firearm."90 Furthermore, said 
the court in Wann, "there is absolutely no evidence that a submachine 
gun in the hands of an individual 'sedentary militia' member would 
have any, much less a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or 
efficiency of a well regulated militia.' "91 
Later federal courts have held that plaintiffs lack standing to chal-
lenge the denial of a permit to carry a concealed weapon, because the 
Second Amendment is a "right held by states," not by private citi-
zens.92 In addition, the courts have held that a federal prohibition 
pertaining to the possession of a firearm by a felon has a justifiable 
defense, which "ensures that [the provision] does not collide with the 
Second Amendment."93 Also, the courts have held that a member of 
an unorganized militia in Georgia was unable to establish that his pos-
session of machine guns and pipe bombs bore any connection to the 









See Cases, 131 F.2d at 922. 
United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 103 (6th Cir. 1976). 
[d. at 106. 
[d. (quoting Stevens V. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971)). 
530 F.2d at 106 (quoting Millerv. United States, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)). 
Block, 81 F.3d 103 (holding that the right to keep and bear arms is meant 
solely to protect the right of the states to keep and maintain armed militia). 
United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 775 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996). 
United States V. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11 th Cir. 1997); Love V. Pepersack, 
47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995). The court declined to consider the issue of 
whether the Second Amendment applies to the states through the Four-
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Even where the Second Amendment is applicable, it does not con-
stitute an absolute barrier to the Congressional regulation of firearms. 
Mter considering several arguments, the Third Circuit decided the 
case on the "broader ground" that weapon-bearing "was never treated 
as anything like an absolute right by the common law. It was regu-
lated by statute as to time and place as far back as the Statute of North-
ampton in 1328 and on many occasions since."95 
The most recent federal case to deal with the Second Amendment, 
and potentially the most controversial, is United States v. Emerson.96 
There, a district judge in Lubbock, Texas, dismissed federal charges 
against a physician for possessing a firearm while under a restraining 
order in a domestic case, holding that the Second Amendment ap-
plies to individuals.97 By striking down the anti-gun law as unconstitu-
tional, the court overturned a long line of decisions holding precisely 
the opposite point of view.98 
Despite acknowledging that "the government claimed it is 'well set-
tled' that the Second Amendment creates a right held by the States 
and does not protect an individual right to bear arms," the court held 
that the federal statute under which defendant was indicted was un-
constitutional. 99 In so holding, the Court rejected the collective right 
argument, instead stating that "the right to keep and bear arms is a 
personal right retained by the people, as opposed to a collective right 
held by States."lOo 
The court took some pains to describe what it called "Second 
Amendment Schools of Thought," providing both textual and histori-
cal analyses. It concluded that a textual analysis of the Second 
Amendment supports an individual right to bear arms. The Court 
noted that if the Amendment consisted solely of its independent 
clause, "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed," then there would be no question whether the right is indi-
vidual in nature. 10 1 
The plain language of the amendment, however, shows: 
teenth Amendment or whether the Second Amendment imposes any limi-
tations on governmental authority to regulate firearms. Love, 47 F.3d at 123. 
95. United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3rd Cir. 1942). 
96. 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999). 
97. Id. at 598-610. 
98. See id. at 607-08; see also Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1894). For 
example, an old Texas statute prohibiting "the carrying of dangerous weap-
ons" was found not to abridge the Second Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1877) (offering 
dicta that laws which forbid the carrying of concealed weapons by individu-
als do not violate the Second Amendment). 
99. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600, 610. 
100. Id. at 601. 
101. !d. at 600-07. 
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That the function of the subordinate clause was not to qual-
ify the right, but instead to show why it must be protected. 
The right exists independent of the existence of the militia. 
If this right were not protected, the existence of the militia, 
and consequently the security of the state, would be 
jeopardized. 102 
145 
The Emerson court's historical analysis yielded a similar conclusion: 
[The] right to bear arms, from English antecedents to the 
drafting of the Second Amendment, bears proof that the 
right to bear arms has consistently been, and should still be, 
construed as an individual right. . .. English citizens were 
also required to provide local police services, such as pursu-
ing criminals and guarding their villages. 103 
Moreover, the court concludes, "[w]ithout that individual right, the 
colonists never could have won the Revolutionary War."104 
Unfortunately, Senate debate on the issue was held in secret, and 
therefore no record exists of that body's deliberations. Thus, the 
Emerson court's reading of history is entirely speculative and 
conjectural. 
The court is similarly cavalier in its handling of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Miller. That case, it declared: 
"[D] id not answer the crucial question of whether the Sec-
ond Amendment embodies an individual or collective right 
to bear arms. Although its holding has been used to justify 
many previous lower federal court rulings circumscribing 
Second Amendment rights, the Court in Miller simply chose 
a very narrow way to rule on the issue of gun possession 
under the Second Amendment, and left for another daX fur-
ther questions of Second Amendment construction."10 
Emerson, likewise, dismisses the scholarship that supports a collectiv-
ist interpretation of the Second Amendment: 
Some scholars have argued that even if the original intent of 
the Second Amendment was to provide an individual right to 
bear arms, modern-day prudential concerns about social 
costs outweigh such original intent and should govern cur-
rent review of the amendment. However, there is a problem 
with such reasoning. If one accepts the plausibility of any of 
102. [d. (citing David E.Johnson, Note, Taking a Second Look at the Second ArT!end-
rT!ent and Modern Gun Control Laws, 86 Ky. LJ. 197,201 (1997-98)). 
103. ErT!erson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (citing CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE 
OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTER-
PRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMs 24-25 (Praeger Press 
1994); JOYCE LEE MALCOM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN 
ANGLo-AMERICAN RIGHT 2 (Harvard Univ. Press 1994)). 
104. [d. at 603. 
105. [d. at 608-09. 
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the arguments on behalf of a strong reading of the Second 
Amendment, but, nevertheless, rejects them in the name of 
social prudence and the present-day consequences of an in-
dividual right to bear arms, why do we not apply such conse-
quentialist criteria to each and every part of the Bill of 
Rights?I06 
The short answer to that question is, we do. For example, the "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine applied by the Court in 1896 was found to be 
unworkable, so it was rejected in 1954.107 
The Emerson court cites Justice Scalia with favor, that there would 
be: 
"[F] ew tears shed if and when the Second Amendment is 
held to guarantee nothing more than the state National 
Guard, this would simply show that the Founders were right 
when they feared that some future generation might wish to 
abandon liberties that they considered essential, and so 
sought to protect those liberties in a Bill of Rights."108 
But Scalia also said that, "there is no need to deceive ourselves as to 
what the original Second Amendment said and meant. Of course, 
properly understood, it is no limitation upon arms control by the 
states."I09 
The court is likewise selective in its reference to historical evidence. 
Professional historians often chide legal academics for the way they 
"pick and choose [historical] facts and incidents ripped out of context 
that serve their purposes."IIO Selective readings of history is precisely 
what was done by the Emerson court. 
C. Law Review Analyses 
Until the 1970s, the Second Amendment had received little atten-
tion from legal scholars. Ill From 1870 (when law reviews first began 
to appear) until 1970, all eleven articles discussing the Second 
Amendment that were published endorsed the collective right 
model. II2 Since then, however, there has been a proliferation of arti-
106. Id. at 609 (citing Levinson, supra note 24, at 658). 
107. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954); Plessyv. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896). 
108. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (quoting Sanford Levinson, Is the Second 
Amendment Finally Becoming Recognized As Part of the Constitution? Voices from 
the Courts, 1998 BYU L. REv. 127, 132). 
109. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (citing Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in 
a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAw 3,137 n.13 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997)). 
1l0. Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REv. 523, 554 (1995). 
Ill. Bogus, supra note 11, at 4. 
112. Id. at 5 n.8. 
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cles both for and against gun control, certainly attributable to the ever 
increasing debate over the Second Amendment.113 
At first most of the legal scholarship reflected the view in the courts, 
that the Second Amendment did not confer upon each citizen the 
right to bear arms. That perspective began to change, however, in the 
last decade, during which several prominent constitutional scholars 
came out in favor of an individual-rights perspective. Among the 
more influential were Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas 
School of Law, Akhil Reed Amar of Yale, William Van Alstyne of Duke, 
and Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard. 1 14 
As Professor Bogus incisively points out, regardless of the merits of 
their arguments, their membership in the individual-right school was 
politically important. They gave this position respectability, and their 
advocacy was loudly trumpeted by the gun rights community. I 15 
Part of this phenomenon can be explained by what one observer 
calls the "law journal breeding ground,"116 which spawns a contrarian 
editorial attraction to articles more for their distinctiveness than their 
scholarship. 
The influx of revisionist Second Amendment scholarship began in 
1989, when Sanford Levinson published an article entitled, TheEmbar-
rassing Second Amendment in the Yale Law journalY7 The article drew 
attention not only because of the pedigree of the author, but also be-







[d. at 8. From 1970 to 1989, there were twenty-five articles published which 
advocated the collective-right view, and twenty-seven articles endorsing the 
individual-right model. [d. Of the latter, "almost sixty percent - were writ-
ten by lawyers who had been directly employed by or represented the NRA 
or other gun rights organizations, although they did not always so identify 
themselves .... " [d.; see, e.g., Barnett & Kates, supra note 1 0; Kates, Jr., supra 
note 10; cf. Articles by Stephen P. Halbrook. Between the two of them, 
Kates and Halbrook have written or edited at least eight books, twenty-three 
law review articles, and countless op-ed pieces advocating the right to bear 
arms and condemning the evils of gun control; Halbrook was paid by the 
NRA; Kates was promoted by the Second Amendment Foundation. See Bo-
gus, supra note 11, at 7. A comprehensive listing of law review literature 
treating the Second Amendment can be found in the symposium issue on 
the subject: Symposium on the Second Amendment: Fresh Look, 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 3(2000). 
See Bogus, supra note 11, at 8, 14-18. 
[d. at 21-22. 
Robert]. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 349, 349 (2000). 
Bogus, supra note 11, at 12 (discussing Levinson, supra note 24). Some spec-
ulate that as a Democrat Levinson wants his party to stop supporting gun 
control because the party needs gun owners in a coalition. See id. 
Bogus, supra note 11, at 12. Levinson acknowledged that "the implications 
of what he viewed as a proper reading of history might push us in unex-
pected, even embarrassing, directions." [d. Professor Bogus notes that Lev-
inson is a political opponent of gun control (a Democrat who wants his 
party to stop supporting gun control because he believes it needs gun own-
ers in its coalition). [d. at 13. 
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The piece was instantly popular with supporters of the National 
Rifle Association, and it remains perhaps the best known law review 
article on the subject. The weakness of Levinson's article is not that it 
concludes with a favorable nod to the gun lobby's reading of the right 
to bear arms, but that it almost completely ignores the substantial case 
law denying that right. 
Several years later Professor Amar appeared with his tome on the 
Bill of Rights. The Second Amendment, he asserted, was the Bill of 
Rights' answer to the federal government's ability to raise a standing 
army, the guarantee to the populace that the instruments with which 
they might alter and abolish the government, even with its standing 
army, would not be taken from themY9 "If the amendment is not 
about the critical difference between the vaunted 'well regulated Mili-
tia' of 'the people' and the disfavored standing army, it is about noth-
ing."120 But the gun lobby interpreted Amar's stance as in its favor. 
In 1994, Professor Van Alstyne weighed in with his article titled: The 
Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Anns, in which he opined: 
"The Second Amendment has generated almost no useful body of 
law."121 But, as Herz points out, Van Alstyne addresses "only the scant 
Supreme Court case law, ignoring the many state and lower federal 
court decisions of the last fIfty-fIve years. "122 Nevertheless, Van Alstyne 
ultimately concludes, "the essential claim ... advanced by the NRA 
with respect to the Second Amendment is extremely strong."123 
Although Professor Tribe can be said ultimately to embrace the col-
lective-right model (the sum and substance of which is that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects the right of the states to have an armed 
militia), he argues that the Second Amendment also grants individu-
als a constitutional right, which must be taken seriously.124 But he 
concedes that "no rights are absolute; and gun control measures that 
'seek only to prohibit a narrow type of weaponry (such as assault 
rifles) or to regulate gun ownership by means of waiting periods, re-
gistration, mandatory safety devises, or the like ... are plainly constitu-
tional.' "125 In fact Amar, Van Alstyne, and Tribe appear more recently 
to have shied away from an absolutist position about individual 
rights. 126 
119. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
47-57 (Yale Univ. Press 1998). 
120. [d. at 56. 
121. Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 1239 ("Indeed, it is substantially accurate to 
say that the useful case law of the Second Amendment, even in 1994, is 
mostly just missing in action."). 
122. Herz, supra note 3, at 141 (discussing Van Alystyne, supra note lO). 
123. Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 1255. 
124. Bogus, supra note 11, at 18-20. 
125. [d. at 19. Others have noted that Tribe's formulation, seeking to fulfill a 
purpose that would satisfy populists and republicans and federalists, is too 
vague to be useful. See id. 
126. [d. at 15-18 (criticizing their theses). 
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Following the school shootings in Littleton, Colorado in April of 
1999, Tribe and Amar seemed to have had second thoughts about the 
Second Amendment - or at least about the political ramifications of 
their work. Amar published an article in the New Republic, and Amar 
and Tribe together wrote an op-ed piece for the New York Times. 127 
The theme of both articles was that "no right is absolute, so (whatever 
the Second Amendment may mean) 'reasonable' and' [r] ealistic' gun 
controls are constitutionally permissible."128 
As it turned out, at the end of the century the scholarly debate was 
just beginning to heat up. Eugene Volokh of the University of Califor-
nia (Los Angeles) wrote The Commonplace Second Amendment,129 in 
which he dissected the amendments clauses into "purpose" and "oper-
ative" clauses, and concluded that we should give primacy to the latter 
- i.e., the right of the citizen to own and bear weapons.130 In re-
sponse, David Williams of Indiana countered with The Unitary Second 
Amendment, in which, although he argued for reading the Amendment 
as "a unitary whole," he nevertheless characterized it as "outdated" 
and "meaningless" in today's world. 131 In a rejoinder, The Amazing 
Vanishing Second Amendment, Volokh engaged in another torturous ma-
nipulation of logic and language to conclude once again that his in-
terpretive technique was superior.132 
The spate of revisionist scholarship finding an individual right did 
not go unchallenged. Indeed, if the effectiveness of a pro-gun control 
scholarly analysis can be measured by the response to it, one of the 
most provocative law review articles of recent vintage was Gun Crazy by 
Andrew D. Herz. Professor Herz noted two differing interpretations 
of the Second Amendment - what he called the "Operative and 
Fabricated Meanings." The gun lobby's view infers a virtually absolute 
right for all law-abiding citizens to possess firearms by focusing almost 
exclusively on the second clause, that "the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms shall not be infringed." Those adopting this position 
clearly emphasize what were allegedly the personal attitudes of the 
Founders - statements in favor of private firearm ownership for vari-
ous purposes but "especially for the purpose of arming the citizenry as 
a precautionary counterweight against potentially tyrannical 
government." 133 
127. See Bogus, supra note 11, at 20. 
128. Id. 
129. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793 
(1998). 
130. Id. at 807. 
131. David C. Williams, Response: The Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
822, 826 (1998). 
132. See Eugene Volokh, Rejoinder: The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 831 (1998). 
133. Herz, supra note 3, at 63-67. 
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As we have seen, proponents of a more limited reading of the Sec-
ond Amendment contend that the right to bear arms was established 
only to preserve a well-regulated militia - that is, a force drawn from 
a specified segment of the population, rather than a collection of all 
armed and independent citizens, and organized, trained, and disci-
plined by the government. The broad individual-right view leans 
heavily on little more than various statements by colonial leaders.134 
As Herz pointed out: 
The ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text 
mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests 
not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is 
dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles 
to cope with current problems and current needs. The gun 
lobby's broad-individual-right view falls apart in our time. 
The passage of two centuries has brought wholesale changes 
in the composition of the well-regulated militia, and in the 
role of firearms in American society.135 
Herz eschewed the academic voice in speaking the plain language 
understandable by laymen and lawyers alike. According to Herz, 
"[t]he Second Amendment was designed to keep alive the militia." 
The gun lobby tells a "constitutional fish story ... swallowed by the 
public, and rarely challenged by politicians, the media, or legal schol-
ars." "The constitutional barrier constructed by the gun lobby, the 
marketing of guns and their images, and the doctrinal inflexibility of 
firearms fundamentalism have been significant factors contributing to 
America's unparalleled level of gun violence."136 He quoted Justice 
William O. Douglas: "A powerful lobby dins into the ears of our citi-
zenry that these gun purchases are constitutional rights protected by 
the Second Amendment. . . . Our decisions belie that argument, for 
the Second Amendment, as noted, was designed to keep alive the 
militia."137 
In concluding that "[t]he second most dangerous consumer prod-
uct on the market is also one of the least regulated . . . [enabling] 
America [to] become the runaway world leader in gun vio-
lence .... "138 Herz also put some of the blame on legal scholars them-
selves - for dereliction of responsibility in both failing to speak out 
and failing to speak the truth. As Professor Levinson has said: "To put 
134. Id. at 65-66. ("The passage of two centuries has brought wholesale changes 
in the composition of the well-regulated militia, and in the role of firearms 
in American society."). 
135. Id. at 67. 
136. See id. at 57, 61, 112. 
137. Adams v. Williams, 407 u.s. 143, 150-51 (1972) (Douglas, j., dissenting). 
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Adams v. Williams and citing Miller, opined 
that "there is no reason why all pistols should not be barred to everyone 
except the police." Id. at 150. 
138. Herz, supra note 3, at 61, 58. 
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it mildly, the Second Amendment is not at the forefront of constitu-
tional discussion .... "139 The Second Amendment is barely discussed 
in Constitutional Law classes, or in the leading texts or casebooks.140 
Some have suggested that this silence is due to the very fact that the 
courts have so clearly rejected the individual-right view, and that the 
issue is closed until and unless it is revisited by the Supreme Court. 
On the other hand, as Herz points out, "the stakes of the political 
battle, and the tone of the spitting match that passes for a debate on 
gun control, are as high and as heated as one could find."141 
Suffice it to say that Gun Crazy generated an almost immediate reac-
tion from the individual-rights lobby. Among the first to respond 
were Randy E. Barnett and Don B. Kates, longtime members and sup-
porters of the activities of the National Rifle Association. In Under Fire: 
The New Consensus on the Second Amendment,142 they retorted with par-
ticular vehemence - characterizing the great majority of legal schol-
ars as supporters of the individual-rights point of view: 
In 1981 Northwestern University law professor Daniel D. Pol-
sby ridiculed the individual rights view of the Amendment as 
"a lot of horsed un g." But as of 1994, having acquainted him-
self with the rather substantial literature of the intervening 
years, Polsby commented: Almost all of the qualified histori-
ans and constitutional-law scholars who have studied the sub-
ject [concur]. The overwhelming weight of authority affirms 
that the Second Amendment establishes an individual right 
to bear arms, which is not dependent upon joining some-
thing like the National Guard. It goes without saying that 
like all constitutional rights, the right to keep and bear arms 
139. Levinson, supra note 24, at 639. 
140. Herz provides an interesting statistical analysis of Second Amendment 
scholarship in which: 
The Second Amendment has only a slightly higher profile within 
the pages of the nearly 650 law reviews and journals listed in the 
Index of Legal Periodicals. At the beginning of the 1993-94 aca-
demic year, the AALS-member law schools employed 1368 self-de-
scribed constitutional law professors. Of that group, only nine have 
ever written a law review article focusing on the Second Amend-
ment. BetweenJanuary 1973 and June 1994, law reviews published 
only fifty-seven articles with a significant Second Amendment fo-
cus, according to the ILP. Of those fifty-seven articles, leading gun-
rights litigators and lobbyists produced at least twenty-six, or nearly 
half. Not content to rely solely on its own lawyers and activists, the 
gun lobby is also working hard to flood the law reviews with 
friendly scholarship from sympathetic law professors and promis-
ing law students. 
Herz, supra note 3, at 137-38. 
141. Id. at 139. 
142. Barnett & Kates, supra note 10, at 1139. 
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is subject to reasonable regulation consistent with its 
purposes. 143 
To Barnett and Kates, the "most plausible" interpretation of Miller is 
to recognize the Court's implicit support of individual rights, particu-
larly insofar as its reference to the term militia. 144 
[T]he history and legislation of [the] Colonies and [the] 
States ... show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all 
males physically capable of acting in concert for the com-
mon defense ... [a] body of citizens enrolled for military 
discipline ... that ordinarily when called for service ... were 
expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of 
the kind in common use at the time.145 
In addition, said Barnett and Kates, "Gun Crazy fails to mention, 
much less address, the general agreement among those scholars who 
have addressed the issue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically intended to incorporate 
the personal right to arms."146 
While Miller remains the only case in which the Supreme Court spe-
cifically construed the Second Amendment, various commentators 
have pointed to dicta in earlier and later cases where the Court men-
tioned in passing the right to bear arms. The earliest was Chief Justice 
Taney's infamous opinion in Dred Scott,147 in which he reasoned that 
to "hold that blacks could be citizens would involve accepting that 
they enjoyed all the rights of citizens: 'the full liberty of speech ... 
and to keep and carry arms wherever they went."'148 
According to individual rights commentators, Taney's opinion as-
sumed that at that time all white citizens enjoyed the guarantee of an 
individual right to keep and carry arms, making no reference to mili-
tia service, and that his comments represented his generation's uni-
versal understanding. 149 
143. Id. at 1141; see also Spitzer, supra note 116, at 379 (noting that gun-rights 
groups have a vested interest in promoting academic writing to legitimize 
their political agendas). Academics for the Second Amendment (ASA) re-
ceived $6,000 from the NRA, which also offered a first prize of $25,000 for 
its 1994-95 essay contest titled "Stand Up for the Second Amendment." 
Spitzer, supra note 116, at 379. It is all "part of a concerted campaign to 
persuade the courts ... to reject what has long been a judicial consensus." 
See id. at 380. The first fruits of this effort may be seen in the 1999 Texas 
case of United States v. n7nerson. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
144. Barnett & Kates, supra note 10, at 1154-55. 
145. Id. at 1155 (quoting U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939». 
146. Id. at 1156. 
147. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
148. Barnett & Kates, supra note 10, at 1158 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 417». 
149. Id. at 1158-59 ("Though abolitionist legal theorists disagreed with Taney on 
virtually everything else, they agreed with him on this."). 
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Similarly, scholars who advocate the individual citizen's right to 
bear arms cite the relatively recent case of Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,150 which reaffirmed the right of privacy as one to be protected 
by the states.151 In that case,justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter 
quoted with approval justice Harlan's statement that "the 'full 
scope ... of liberty' is not limited to 'the freedom of speech, press, 
and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures.' "152 Thereby, according to the anti-
gun control forces, conveying the view that "such an un enumerated 
right had the same constitutional status as all the enumerated rights 
in this list."153 
The blunderbuss attacks on Gun Crazy certainly did not go unan-
swered. Most notable among the more recent defenders of the collec-
tive-right theorists has been Carl T. Bogus of the Roger Williams 
University School of Law. In The Hidden History of the Second Amend-
ment,154 Professor Bogus offers a thorough and compelling history be-
hind the Amendment, particularly the motivations of its principal 
drafter,james Madison, which yields ample evidence that the Framers 
did not embrace the notion that every citizen should have an individ-
ual right to bear arms. 
Subsequently, in a symposium issue of the Chicago-Kent Law Review, 
Bogus presented a comprehensive catalogue of the research data on 
interpretation of the Second Amendment. From the time law review 
articles first began to be indexed in 1887 until 1960, all law review 
articles dealing with the Second Amendment endorsed the collective 
right model. Things changed, however, "[f]rom 1970 to 1989, twenty-
five articles adhering to the collective right view were published ... 
but so were twenty-seven articles endorsing the individual right 
model."155 At least sixteen of these individual right articles (almost 
sixty percent), however, were written by lawyers who had been directly 
employed by or represented the NRA or other gun rights organiza-
tions, although they did not always so identify themselves.156 
150. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
151. Id. at 834. 
152. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 10, at 1159. 
153. Id. at 1159. "All these rights retained by the people are considered by the 
Court to be on par. No mention of a militia-centric qualification is made." 
Id. at 1159-60. 
154. Bogus, supra note 38, at 309. 
155. See id. at 8. 
156. See Bogus, supra note 11, at 3-5. To date, Halbrook and Kates have written 
or edited at least eight books, twenty-three law review articles, and numer-
ous op-ed pieces about the right to bear arms and the evils of gun control. 
See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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1. History as Construed by Law Professors 
In 1994, Harvard University Press published To Keep and Bear Arms: 
The Origins of an Anglo-American Right157 by Joyce Lee Malcolm, a 
source often used by individual-rights theorists to bolster their case. 158 
But, as historian Michael Bellesiles has found, actual firearms owner-
ship in America has been greatly exaggerated and mythologized.159 
Moreover, the definition of the citizen militias at the center of this 
debate was always limited to men roughly between the ages of eigh-
teen and forty-five. Legal protection for personal self-defense arises 
from the British common law tradition and modern criminal law, not 
from constitutional law. The Constitution clearly and forcefully dis-
dains anything resembling a right of revolution, as it gives Congress 
the powers "to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws 
of the Union."160 
Robert J. Spitzer of the State University of New York, in Lost and 
Found: Researching the Second Amendment, likewise finds that the mean-
ing of the Second Amendment is relatively clear - reiterating what 
former Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote: "[The Second Amend-
ment] must be read as though the word 'because' was the opening 
word."161 He too points out that debate during the First Congress 
over the language that eventually became the Second Amendment 
dealt entirely with several narrow military questions - and that some 
legal writers, publishing primarily in law journals, have sought to spin 
out other interpretations of the Second Amendment-regardless of 
history and jurisprudence. 162 
Professor Spitzer echoes the sentiment that such claims reflect a 
shameless attempt to give legitimacy to a claim that cannot stand on 
its merits. The primary argument of the individualists is made by 
"plucking key phrases from court cases and colonial or federal debate 
that refer to a right of Americans to own and carry guns."163 Then 
comes a "unilateral declaration that the individualist view represents a 
new academic consensus ... roughly akin to a participant in a contest 
who suddenly stops competing, declares victory, and leaves in the 
hope that the declaration may become fact."164 
157. JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP & BEAR ARMs: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT (1994). 
158. Justice Antonin Scalia described the book as "excellent." Bogus, supra note 
11, at 11. 
159. See Bellesiles, supra note 16, at 567. 
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 15. 
161. Spitzer, supra note 116, at 350. 
162. Id. at 350-52. 
163. Id. at 356. 
164. Id. at 356. Spitzer argues that the idea that vigilantism and armed insurrec-
tion are as constitutionally sanctioned as voting is an absurd proposition, 
ignoring "a considerable portion of the body of writing on the Second 
Amendment." Id. at 362, 381-82. 
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The Second Amendment is based partly on the British 1688 Bill of 
Rights, and is related to the right-to-bear-arms provisions in Framing-
era state constitutions. The revolutionary focus of the Second Amend-
ment is founded on the idea that the right to bear arms exists to pro-
tect the American populace from governmental tyranny. 165 The 
individualist vision of the Second Amendment, as derived from a Re-
construction-Era re-interpretation of the Amendment, has by now be-
come predominant in the minds of governments and policy-makers. 
The right to bear arms as a necessity of revolution, like the ability of 
the people to practice that right, is a distant memory.166 
One of the most thoroughgoing historical examinations by a law 
professor is Michael Dorfs What Does the Second Amendment Mean To-
day?167 The relevance of the opening (purpose) clause to its mean-
ing, says Dorf, "would seem so obvious as not to need justifying were it 
not for academic efforts to minimize its weight."168 
Some non-lawyer historians labor under the misimpression that 
Constitutional interpretation tries to recapture nothing more than 
"original meaning." Dorf points an accusing finger at Malcolm: If we 
disagree with the Founding Fathers' views as she understands them, 
he says, we have misinterpreted history; the only legitimate path to 
change that history is by way of Constitutional amendment. For exam-
ple, the Second Amendment neither prevents the establishment or 
maintenance of a federal standing army, nor does it insulate state mili-
tias from federal control. Why, then, did anti-federalists and others 
who disdained standing armies settle for the Second Amendment? 
Even professional historians specializing in the period do not have a 
definitive answer to this question. 169 
2. The Constitution in Evolution 
Is the Second Amendment an anachronism? The argument made 
by various commentators over the past several years is that the Amend-
ment was drafted to serve a particular political purpose that has long 
since dried up, a theory that would render the question whether citi-







See Brent]. McIntosh, The Revolutionary Second Amendment, 51 ALA. L. REv. 
673, 674 (2000). 
See id. at 674-79. 
Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CH1.-KENT 
L. REv. 291 (2000). 
Id. at 30l. 
Id. at 309-312. "[T]he armed resistance Madison contemplates in The Feder-
alist No. 46 quite clearly occurs ... [among] the states-not by self-styled 
patriots." Id. The Founders' conception of armed resistance, as well as 
their concern about standing armies, "is probably best understood ... as 
part of a struggle between the states and the federal government rather 
than between individuals and ... the government." Id. 
Id. at 302. 
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It has often been said that the Constitution is a living document, 
one that was purposefully designed to be read and interpreted accord-
ing to the tenor of the times. 171 It is not the work of men who could 
foresee all future events and choose words that would fit them. Its 
interpretation calls for strong degrees of contemporary wisdom and 
flexibility.l72 
The task of applying the Founders' understanding of weaponry to a 
world they could not have anticipated - such as chemical and biolog-
ical and nuclear armaments - is obviously subjective. This is not, of 
course, unique to the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court, for 
example, had no trouble understanding that freedom of the press 
should apply to radio and televisions as well as to newspapers. Simi-
larly, advanced forms of surveillance call for new interpretations of 
the Fourth Amendment. 173 
In colonial times, "[p] ossession of firearms was not understood as a 
collective right but rather as a collective dUty."174 Said 1udge Robert 
Bork, concurring in Oltman v. Evans: "[I] t is the task of the judge in 
this generation to discern how the framers' values, defined in the con-
text of the world they knew, apply to the world we knoW."175 
In the eighteenth century, the militia's primary responsibility was 
internal security, as opposed to public defense. 176 With the Civil War 
emerged organized police forces and state militias. The right to bear 
arms was largely the duty of a responsible citizenry to participate in 
the collective self-defense of the community. Today that duty is per-
formed by the government in its maintenance of a professional police 
force. 177 When self-styled patriots objected to what they saw as acts of 
tyranny in the Whiskey Rebellion, they took up arms - what they per-
ceived as their Second Amendment right - and the rebellion was put 
down by the militias. 178 
As a democracy matures, the risk that a tyrant will seize the reins of 
government diminishes, as does the need for a "well-regulated militia" 
to quell tyranny. As one commentator stated: 
The most common argument for most forms of gun control 
- from laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, 
to those requiring trigger locks, even to near-complete bans 
on possession - is that firearms possession does not make for 
greater safety but actually increases the risk of injury or 
171. United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D. Cal. 1990). 
172. Dorf, supra note 167, at 340-41. 
173. [d. at 318. 
174. Bellesiles, supra note 16, at 573-74. 
175. 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
176. Bellesiles, supra note 16, at 581. 
177. Dorf, supra note 167, at 323. 
178. [d. at 320. Prior to the Civil War, it may have still been thought "that state-
organized armed resistance remained available as the ultimate check on 
federal power. That bloody conflagration taught otherwise." [d. at 321. 
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death. A (hand)gun obtained for defense against felons has 
a greater chance, gun control advocates say, of being used 
opportunistically against a family member or discharging ac-
cidentally. Others contest these claims. They argue ... fire-
arm ownership reduces ... violent crime because criminals 
are deterred by the risk to themselves if they attack armed 
law-abiding citizens. I79 
D. The Plain Meaning oj the Second Amendment 
Simply put, the plain meaning of the Second Amendment should 
be clear to a reasonably literate reader of the English language-as it 
has been to the Supreme Court and virtually all other courts-which 
have concluded that the Amendment does not confer upon every citi-
zen the right to own a firearm. I8o 
Standard rules of constitutional interpretation do not support the 
arguments of those favoring individual rights. I81 A more plausible 
reading of the Second Amendment is that it was intended to prevent 
the federal government from abolishing state militias. I82 This conclu-
sion does not require the kind of tortured exegesis of the Second 
Amendment that some scholars feel necessary. 183 
Many gun-rights activists dismiss the introductory clause as nothing 
more than a declaration of political philosophy, but the plain mean-
ing of that language suggests a narrow focus on the militia. As the late 
Justice Brennan asked, "The ultimate question must be, what do the 
words of the text mean in our time?"184 
Recognizing that interpretation of words depends largely on the 
predilections of the interpreter, cannot (and should not) a line be 
drawn between generally accepted definitions and contextual mean-
ings and speculative conjecture?185 On its face, the language of the 
Second Amendment should not lend itself to ambiguity, especially in 
light of its historical context. Properly punctuated, the sentence 
should read as follows: A well regulated Militia being necessary to the 








Id. at 332. 
See infra notes 220-25; see also supra Part III.A-C. 
See generally Dorf, supra note 167 (arguing both the individual and collective 
rights interpretation of the Second Amendment). 
See id. at 294. 
See generally id. at 291. Professor DorE's historical analysis appears unim-
peachable, and his carefully organized and meticulously rationalized analy-
sis yields the same conclusion - that the collective-right theory is the 
correct one - as the much simpler interpretive approach advocated here. 
Id. But his study, like many on both sides of the question, runs the risk of 
missing the forest for the trees: in being so exhaustively thorough it is 
overdone; its sheer weight may be its undoing. 
Herz, supra note 3, at 65-66. 
See infra Part V. 
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shall not be infringed. 186 The first clause thus becomes clearly prefa-
tory, put there to explain the primary purpose of the Second Amend-
ment as set out in the second clause. The two clauses are intentionally 
and inextricably related. The reason that the people must have the 
right to keep and bear arms is to enable a well-regulated militia. 
It is the excess of commas that cause confusion, but even with them 
the meaning of the sentence is not substantially changed. "A well reg-
ulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."187 In 
grammatical terminology, although there is no need for the first 
comma (after "Militia"), its presence merely makes the second clause 
("being necessary to the security of a free State") restrictive - that is, 
it explains that a well-regulated militia is needed for security. If that 
comma were removed, the first clause would become explanatory ap-
positive of the second, but all of it would still carry a similar meaning. 
Either way, the first clause(s) are intended to represent the reason for 
the second clause(s). 
The comma between "Arms" and "shall" is, as a matter of style and 
clarity, confusing and superfluous. The only comma necessary to un-
derstanding the sentence is the one that follows the word "State." 
Gun advocates who also fancy themselves as grammarians have par-
ticular difficulty with this analysis. G. Gordon Liddy, for example, of-
fers an explanation that is clearly wrong. Liddy claims that those who 
would link the two clauses of the Second Amendment simply do not 
know how to parse an English sentence; the first clause is not prefa-
tory, he says, but is a present participle - standing alone as a separate 
thought. 188 Liddy thus fails to understand several of the more esoteric 
rules of English structure: That a present participle followed by a 
comma is directly related to the clause that follows, whether or not it 
is restrictive or nonrestrictive.189 
IV. LAWSUITS, LOBBIES, AND LEGISLATION 
Outlaw Guns and Only Outlaws Will Have Guns.190 
186. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
187. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
188. Liddy is the host of the G. Gordon Liddy Show, a conservative radio program. 
Others have likewise confused the plain meaning of the Amendment (as 
advocated in this Article) by way of tortured grammatical acrobatics. See, 
e.g., Ronald S. Resnick, Private Arms as the Palladium of Liberty: The Meaning of 
The Second Amendment, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1, 1-12 (1999). 
189. See JOHN C. HODGES ET AL., THE WRITER'S HARBRACE HANDBOOK 427, 641-
42,782 (Harcourt Coli. 2001). 
190. The argument suggested by this slogan has been a staple of NRA lobbying 
for many years. Gun-rights advocates contend that firearm regulation fo-
cusing on law-abiding citizens who use guns for legal purposes, rather than 
on criminals who would ignore any restrictive gun laws, is misplaced. See 
generally J. Warren Cassidy, The Case for Firearms . .. The NRA's i!.xecutive Vice 
President Says Guns Will Keep America Free, TIME, Jan. 29, 1990, at 22. 
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A. Lawsuits 
Although many lawsuits have been dismissed for failure to state a 
claim on which relief can be granted, Ohio's Supreme Court agreed 
to review Cincinnati's appeal against gun manufacturer Beretta. 191 
In 1998, the city of New Orleans became the first municipality to 
file a lawsuit against gun manufacturers. In its suit against fifteen of 
them, the city sought to recover the costs of "police protection, emer-
gency services, police pensions, medical care and lost tax revenue re-
lated to handgun violence."192 The city's primary arguments were 
that guns are unreasonably dangerous because they do not have safety 
devices to prevent unauthorized use, and that gun manufacturers 
failed to warn consumers about the danger of children obtaining a 
gun that could still have a round of ammunition in it even after the 
magazine had been removed. 193 
Similar suits ensued, from the cities of Atlanta, Bridgeport (Conn.), 
Chicago, and Miami/Dade County (Fla.). Using the alternate theory 
of "public nuisance," Chicago alleged that the gun manufacturers 
"knowingly oversupply or saturate the market with their products in 
areas where gun control laws are less restrictive, knowing that persons 
will illegally bring them into the jurisdictions where they are illegal" 
and that "many of the firearms the defendants manufacture are de-
signed specifically for street fighting and not for self-protection or 
valid recreational purposes."194 
In the Bridgeport and Miami-Dade suits, the cities sued for compen-
satory damages under the theories of design defects, and inadequate 
warnings, and/or public nuisance. Judges dismissed the lawsuits in 
both cases.195 
In the past, plaintiffs have relied on two theories of strict liability 
when suing gun manufactures: the risk-utility test and the "abnormally 
dangerous activity" doctrine. 196 Using the risk-utility approach, the 
plaintiff must prove that the risks of the product outweigh its social 
utility.197 Under the "abnormally dangerous activity" doctrine, the 
plaintiff would have to prove that "one who carries on an abnormally 
dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or 








Carolyn Magnuson, Cities, Gun Makers Keep Firing, 37 TRIAL 17 (Mar. 2001); 
see also Cincinnati v. Beretta U.SA Corp., 740 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001). 
Doug Morgan, What in the Wide, Wide World of Torts is Going On? First To-
bacco, Now Guns: An Examination of Hamilton v. Accu-tek and the Cities' Law-
suits Against the Gun Industry, 69 MISS. LJ. 521, 529 (1999). 
Id. at 528-30. 
!d. at 532. 
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. CV990153198S, 1999 WL 1241909 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-1941 
CA-06, 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1999). 
Morgan, supra note 191, at 537. 
Id. at 537-38. 
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cised the utmost care to prevent the harm."198 Courts have rejected 
this argument because "the doctrine encompasses activity that is dan-
gerous in and of itself, and the manufacturing of handguns is a matter 
of common usage."199 
In 1985, a Maryland court did impose strict liability on the manufac-
turer of an inexpensive type of handgun known as the "Saturday 
Night Special" - finding that manufacturers of such pistols could be 
held strictly liable "to innocent persons who suffer gunshot injures 
from the criminal use of their products."200 Subsequently, however, 
the Maryland legislature superceded that decision by prohibiting the 
imposition of strict liability upon gun manufacturers for damages re-
sulting from the criminal use of a firearm by a third person.201 
B. Lobbies 
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger's view of the gun lobby's Sec-
ond Amendment distortions - which he angrily described as a "fraud 
on the American public"202 - has been lost in a sea of gun-rights 
propaganda. 
Although over the years Congress has placed some limitations on 
the receipt, possession and transportation of firearms and proposals 
for national registration or prohibition of firearms,203 the National 
Rifle Association has been virtually omnipotent in pushing federal 
and state legislation that diminish restrictions on gun ownership. 
During the last decade alone, the NRA poured more than $15 million 
into the campaigns of congressional candidates and political par-
ties.204 In 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to loosen re-
strictions on gun purchases and gun safety, handing the NRA a well-
bought victory.205 In 2001, there were only two anti-gun bills intro-










Id. at 541 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976». 
Id. at 542. 
Kelley v. RG. Indus. Inc., 304 Md. 124, 157,497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (1985). 
MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 36-I(h) (2002). 
The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: First Freedoms (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 
16, 1991). 
Especially since 1971, when the National Commission on Reform of Federal 
Criminal Laws was established. 
Scott Harshbarger, ElectionEar Spotlight on the NRA: Power & Influence 
Through Money, 1 COMMON CAUSE 4, May 12, 2000, available at http:/ / 
www.commoncause.org/campaign2000/051200.htm. (last visited May 15, 
2003). 
Eric Pianin & juliet Eilperin, House Votes to Weaken Senate Gun Show Checks, 
WASH. POST, June 18, 1999, at AI. 
H.R 891, 167th Congo (2001); H.R 2773, 107th Congo (2001). The No 
Guns for Violent Perpetrators Act, introduced by Rep. Dennis Moore on 
March 6, 2001, and The Accidental Shooting Prevention Act, introduced by 
Rep. james R Langevin on August 3, 2001; see also Dick Snider, Guns 'n 
Moses: The NRA's Disarming Deception, TOPEKA CAPITAL - JOURNAL, May 23, 
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The NRA's power comes in large measure from convincing its four 
million members that any gun control, no matter how reasonable, is 
the first step down a slippery slope at the bottom of which is the estab-
lishment of a police state that will confiscate all private guns.207 In so 
doing the organization ignores historical facts: 
l. There hasn't been any governmental seizure of privately-
owed weapons since colonial times. 
2. The Founding Fathers viewed such regulation as both le-
gal and necessary. 
3. There was ample regulatory legislation governing the stor-
age of arms and gunpowder. 
4. A large portion of the adult white, male population of 
Pennsylvania, by some estimates as much as forty percent, 
was considered unqualified to own a firearm. 
5. There were never enough private guns to confront a mili-
tia; nor was there ever a militia force that included all able-
bodied men. The Continental Army, not any militia, won 
the Revolutionary War. 208 
In 1993, the NRA created a group known as Academics for the Sec-
ond Amendment, and began distributing large sums of money to 
scholars who shared its views of the Second Amendment. In 1994, it 
launched an annual "Stand Up for the Second Amendment" essay 
contest, offering a first prize of $25,000 for publication of law review 
pieces supporting the rights of gun owners.209 
The gun lobby's misinformation campaign distorts the text of the 
Constitution itself. Official NRA products, from belt buckles to beer 
mugs, simply eliminate the Second Amendment's troublesome intro-
ductory clause, and quoting only what it wants to advertise: "The right 
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."210 In so 
doing, the gun lobby asserts that the Second Amendment is (or 
should be) an all-purpose barrier to virtually all gun control propos-
als. This Constitutional deception has been repeated so often that the 
public is largely ignorant of what the Second Amendment says. A 
1991 Los Angeles Times poll found that although only thirty-nine per-
cent of those surveyed felt that the Constitution should protect the 
right of all individuals to own guns, sixty-two percent believed that the 
Bill of Rights explicitly granted such a right.211 
2001, available at http://www.cjonline.com/stories/052301/opi_snider. 
shtml. 
207. Snider, supra note 206. 
208. [d. 
209. Bogus, supra note 11, at 13-14. In 1991 and 1992, the N.R.A. gave $38,569 
to Halbrook alone. [d.; see also Halbrook, supra note 23. 
210. Herz, supra note 3, at 94. 
211. [d. at 107-08 ("Other surveys have documented a similar ignorance of the 
Second Amendment's narrow judicial interpretation."). 
162 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 32 
Gun-rights advocates employ three basic arguments against virtually 
all gun-control proposals: "(1) Guns Don't Kill, People Do; (2) Outlaw 
Guns and Only Outlaws Will Have Guns; and (3) There are already 20,000 
state and national firearms regulations, and those places with the strictest gun 
control have the highest crime rates. '~12 
The NRA's endless mantra that "guns don't kill people - people 
kill people" ignores the many studies indicating that people without 
easy access to guns kill far fewer people than those with easy access. 
Research indicates that an assault on friends and family involving a 
gun is twelve times more deadly than one without a gun. Some killers 
seek out lethal weapons after deciding to kill; however, more often 
gun-inflicted deaths result from impromptu arguments and fights 
where the killer already has access to a gun. Thus, it seems clear that 
"these deaths would largely be replaced by non-fatal injuries if a gun 
were not handy."213 
Thus a far more appropriate generality would be that "[p] eople 
without guns injure people, guns kill them."214 
"Outlaw Guns and Only Outlaws Will Have Guns" is another facile 
deception. The NRA fervently opposes even background checks for 
potential gun buyers.215 Under current law, for example, private un-
licensed dealers - those who sell their weapons at gun shows and flea 
markets - are not required to perform background checks, and often 
sell their firearms to minors.216 The boys who committed massacre at 
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado had their weapons 
purchased legally at a gun shOW.217 
The NRA claims that few of the federal gun-control statutes already 
on the books are being effectively enforced - that there has been 
only one prosecution under the federal law. The United States Sen-
tencing Commission, however, noted that 7.6% of all federal 
sentences imposed were for firearms violations, totaling 4,489.218 This 
is not to mention the numerous state prosecutions as well.219 Simi-
larly misleading is the claim that jurisdictions with the strictest gun 
212. Id. at 83. 
213. Id. at 82 n.107. 
214. Susan P. Baker, Without Guns, Do People Kill People?, 75 AM.]. PUB. HEALTH 
587,588 (1985) ("To put it more plainly, as a police officer remarked to a 
journalist: 'We've yet to see a drive-by stabbing ... ·); see also Editorial, Hand-
guns Kill More than They Protect, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 14, 1992, at 16. 
215. Dan Eggen, Domestic Abusers Bought Guns; Background Checks for Thousands 
Not Completed, GAO Says, WASH. POST, June 26, 2002. 
216. Andy Kravetz, Organization Says Newspapers Should Police Themselves on Firearm 
Sales, PEORIA JOURNAL STAR, Dec. 5, 2002. 
217. CBS News: Evening News with Dan Rather: Gun Shows Selling Machine Gun Parts 
(CBS Broadcast, Nov. 12, 2000). 
218. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Distribution of Sentenced Guideline Offenders by 
Select Primary Offense Category, available at www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/2001/ 
4cOl.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003). 
219. Id. 
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controls have the highest crime rates. A more plausible explanation is 
that jurisdictions with the highest crime rates feel the need to enact 
stricter gun controls. 
The media and legal scholars owe their readers the full story in con-
text. Stories about gun-control inevitably refer to the battles between 
the gun-control advocates and those who trumpet the Constitution's 
hallowed "right" to bear arms. There is virtually no coverage in the 
press of the almost universally narrow judicial interpretation of the 
Second Amendment.22o 
Elected officials, meanwhile, unashamedly pander to the gun lobby. 
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft is a prime example. During his 
confirmation hearing he had promised that he would defend the na-
tion's gun laws. But after taking office, he sent a letter to the NRA for 
distribution at its annual convention, in which he touted his pro-gun 
views on the Second Amendment.221 
Perhaps, then, U.S. actions regarding the recent United Nations 
conference to limit small-arms trafficking should not have come as 
any surprise. The conference was intended to result in a non-binding 
action plan against trafficking in small arms.222 The proposed inter-
national accord, which deals with the illegal sale of military weapons 
across national borders, would do nothing to restrict the sale of guns 
within the United States.223 It was therefore little more than a gratui-
tous and blatant appeal to the National Rifle Association for the U.S. 
representative at the conference to invoke the Second Amendment to 
justify the administration's objections to the United Nations report. 
The real reason for the U.S. position is that America is the world's 
largest exporter of small arms (accounting for about $1.3 billion of 
the $4 billion total sold worldwide), and the major small-arms produc-
ers and buyers oppose it.224 
On the other hand, gun-control advocates would like to license and 
register all handguns, eliminate the gun-show loophole, and assure 
responsibility within the gun-manufacturing industry. Current federal 
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Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Respects, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 192/15 
(2001), available at http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms. 
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A26. The U.N. had "hoped the meeting might produce serious and binding 
restrictions on the international sale of assault rifles," which "have fueled 46 
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Nations, WASH. POST,July 10, 2001, at A20. 
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gun shows held annually - at which they can legally purchase a fire-
arm without any background check, waiting period, or registration re-
quirement.225 The proposed licensing scheme would be similar to 
that required of drivers before allowing them to use cars. The waiting 
period would give police time to check local criminal records, and 
allow people to "cool off' (diminishing impulse suicides and other 
rash acts of violence) .226 
Gun-control advocates would also like to make gun manufacturers 
liable for any damage resulting from negligent design and marketing 
- similar to what has been done in the automobile and tobacco indus-
tries. Virtually every other consumer product in the country is regu-
lated as well. Handguns are the most notable and lethal exception. 
In addition, guns can and should be made child-proof. In 1997, 
federal legislation was introduced to require child-safety devices on 
handguns.227 Some eight gun manufacturers agreed to the proposal, 
including the nation's largest gun producer, Smith and Wesson.228 
When Smith and Wesson announced that "child safety locks make 
sense for its business;" that it wants to manufacture and sell guns dif-
ferently; that it would like to make guns easier to trace; and that it 
endorses both safety courses for gun owners and background checks 
at gun shows, the company received a letter from the NRA stating that 
the gun makers had been conned by the government.229 
Nor has the NRA allowed gun manufacturers voluntarily to enter 
into the area of reform. In March 2000, Smith and Wesson, the na-
tion's largest producer of handguns, entered into an agreement with 
the federal government in an attempt to ward off potential lawsuits. 
The agreement provided that gun dealers would begin maintaining 
"computerized records of every sale and store all their guns ... in 
some kind of a vault [and] ... limit customers to one gun every two 
225. Press Release, Americans for Gun Safety (AGS) Foundation, New Report 
Shows 32 States with Gun Show Loophole are Flooding the Nation with 
Crime Guns (April 19, 2001), available at www.w3.agsfoundation.com/ 
press_041901.html. 
226. Letter from Sarah Brady, Registered in Your Name: 2000 Referendum on 
Guns and Violence in the United States (on file with author); see Waiting 
Periods for Hand[fUn Purchases, Americans for Gun Safety Foundation, at 
http://w3.agsfoundation.com/s_waitl.html. 
227. Press Release, Handgun Control, Inc., Jim and Sarah Brady Call for Child 
Safety Locks to be Sold With Every Hand[fUn (Mar. 12, 1999) available at 
www.bradycampaign .org/press/release.asp?Record=59. 
228. See, e.g., Pat Griffith, Clinton Also Hail Eight Firms Making New Hand[fUn Locks, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, October 10, 1997, at A12. 
229. ABC News, A Conspiracy Against Smith & Wesson?, (Mar. 30, 2000) at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/guns000330.html (last vis-
ited May 15, 2003). Smith & Wesson, the nation's largest gun manufac-
turer, recently signed a binding agreement with various jurisdictions in 
which it agreed to drastically change the way guns are manufactured and 
distributed. Id. 
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weeks."230 Not to be deterred, the NRA notified its over three million 
members of the proposed agreement, and Smith and Wesson was in-
undated with phone calls and e-mail messages decrying the pact. The 
bad publicity also led other gun manufacturers, including Glock, to 
back out of the agreement, leaving Smith and Wesson alone among 
potential reformers in the industry.231 
The Juvenile Justice bill required a seventy two-hour background 
check for guns sold at gun shows.232 The NRA argued that gun shows 
would go out of business if 72-hour checks were required: "[g]un hat-
ers are trying to dismantle the Second Amendment."233 
C. Legislation 
In the wake of gun violence in the schools, various states have tried 
to enact gun-control legislation aimed at parents and children. In 
2001, a bill entitled the "Firearms Safety and Accident Avoidance Pro-
gram" was proposed in the Maryland General Assembly.234 The mea-
sure, which would have mandated that the State Board of Education 
establish a "firearms safety and accident avoidance program for stu-
dents in kindergarten through grade 6," failed in committee.235 
Other jurisdictions have attempted to control gun violence by hold-
ing parents responsible for their children's offenses. In 1995, the New 
Jersey legislature debated the Parental Responsibility Bill.236 How 
would parental liability affect gun violence by teenagers? The com-
mon-law rule is that no one is responsible for the negligent acts of 
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such as that between a parent and a child.237 States like this theory 
because they "seek to prompt parents to control their children, to pro-
vide a better example for them, and to offer an alternate source of 
support for their children."238 
Forms of parental liability can vary from state to state. A New Mex-
ico statute permits a parent to be made a party to any complaint alleg-
ing a child's delinquency.239 California law allows for parents of 
delinquent gang members to be held liable for their children's actions 
by subjecting the parents to fine and/or imprisonment for failing to 
properly observe and control their children.24o Other states require 
that parents attend counseling and provide financial support for their 
children if they are detained for specific offenses.241 
Critics of parental responsibility bills argue that such legislation 
would have a disparate impact on various lower socio-economic 
groups - including urban families, single-parent families, and chil-
dren from two-parent homes whose parents both work - and that the 
legislation would be held unconstitutional in a court challenge. While 
the concept of holding parents accountable for their children's ac-
tions may sound like a viable alternative, the right of privacy is 
im plicated. 242 
Another problem with parental liability legislation is that it assumes 
that parents have the ability to control their children. Although most 
states' legislation attaches parental liability only where the parent 
"knew or should have known" about the activities of their offspring, 
this standard cannot possibly encompass every parent/child relation-
ship. There is a general consensus that parents have a diminishing 
ability to control their children as the children grow older.243 
In 2000, Congress enacted legislation to close a loophole in the 
Brady Bill,244 which had allowed individuals to purchase guns at gun 
shows without a background check and without identification.245 On 
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 316 (1965) (discussing affirma-
tive duties); Lanterman v. Wilson, 277 Md. 364, 371, 354 A.2d 432, 436 
(1976). 
238. Michelle L. Maute, New Jersey Takes Aim at Gun Violence l!y Minors: Parental 
Criminal Liability, 26 RUTGERS LJ. 431, 441 (1995). 
239. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-28(a) (Michie 1999). 
240. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1999). 
241. Maute, supra note 238, at 441-42. 
242. Id. at 450. 
243. Id. at 458. 
244. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (1993). The Brady Bill, or Brady Handgun Violence Pre-
vention Act of 1993, provides for a waiting period before a handgun can be 
sold by a firearms dealer. Additionally, the Act established the instant crim-
inal background check system, which is used by gun dealers to conduct 
background check before a sale can be made. Id. 
245. 18 U.S.C. 9200(t) (1) (B)(ii) (2000). The Bill states: 
[A] licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer 
shall not transfer a firearm to any other person who is not licensed 
under this chapter, unless ... 3 business days (meaning a day on 
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the state level, the New Jersey Senate approved a bill requiring child 
safety locks on all handguns when the locks become "commercially 
available."246 Connecticut passed legislation allowing judges to issue 
warrants for the "seizure of any firearms possessed by a person who 
poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself ... or to other 
individuals. "247 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The blunderbuss proliferation of gun-rights scholarship in recent 
years has perverted both the historical context and plain meaning of 
the Second Amendment. This Article has sought to debunk the cur-
rent spate of such revisionist history, to re-focus upon the lone court 
decision supporting the individualist point of view, and to expose the 
pervasive extent and blinding effects of lobbying by the National Rifle 
Association. 
Much of the new scholarship flies in the face of a history of unequiv-
ocal holdings by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts support-
ing a collectivist point of view - that is, that the right to bear arms is 
conditioned upon the need for security of the (collective) group - as 
well as the courts' clear understanding that the Constitution in no way 
limits states from enacting and imposing their own restrictive gun 
legislation. 
The overwhelming weight of available historical evidence demon-
strates that the primary concern of the Founding Fathers was the con-
cept of a militia, as distinguished from a standing federal army, not 
the right of individual citizens to own firearms. Historical documents 
provide no clear data that either the colonies or the early states con-
templated the need for an individual right. 
The documentary evidence from the Constitutional Conventions 
supports the proposition that the issue of prime concern regarding 
the right to bear arms was preservation of the state militia. Eight of 
the original thirteen states - Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, New 
Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Georgia -
represented the position that a well-regulated militia is an important 
function of state security. For them, the idea of an individual right to 
bear arms was necessary for the security of the individual was never 
addressed. 
Id. 
which State offices are open) have elapsed since the licensee con-
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tion (g) or (n) of this section. 
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James Madison, the architect of the Second Amendment, did not 
consider an armed citizenry existing independently of any govern-
ment as the best deterrent against despotism. 
On the other hand, the various provisions regarding the right to 
bear arms do reveal the precise lines of political factions on the de-
bate: One side not recognizing a right to bear arms as necessary for 
the preservation of a state militia, the other seeing to the contrary and 
in addition other purposes served by such a right. Meanwhile, in the 
middle was a moderate faction recognizing the right - but only in 
the interests of state security. 
Maryland, founded originally as a haven from religious persecution, 
but since developed into a stalwart of other constitutional civil liber-
ties, provided in its constitution for a militia, but not for an explicit 
right to bear arms. Maryland took the position that some state control 
of military forces was preferable, but stood only for the proposition 
that substituting a militia in place of a standing army is an "essential 
right in maintaining governments of free men." 
Records of gun regulation in the states, both before and after ratifi-
cation of the Second Amendment, likewise, strongly suggest that it did 
not contemplate the ownership and use of firearms by private citizens. 
Although interpretation of words depends largely on the predilec-
tions of the interpreter, the plain meaning of the Second Amendment 
is also dictated by basic rules of grammatical construction and diction-
ary definitions. Thus - as virtually every court facing the issue has 
found - the right to bear arms is wholly dependent upon the need to 
maintain a militia. 
Moreover, history strongly leads to the conclusion that the Framers' 
intentions regarding the Second Amendment were equally clear. The 
Founding Fathers were concerned with communal defense. They 
never contemplated, nor were they likely ever to consider, the right of 
every citizen to purchase, possess, or use whatever weapon might be 
on the market at the time - lock, stock, and barrel, musket or ma-
chine gun. 
They were much too sensible for that. 
